The embodiments herein relate generally to security systems.
NSA's Commercial Solutions for Classified (CSfC) program permits commercial cryptography products to be used for protecting US National Security Systems (NSS). Originally, CSfC mandated the use of Suite B cryptography—specifically, the use of Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) for the purpose of authenticating cryptographic peers to each other, and Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) for key exchange.
In late 2015, NSA raised concerns about the threat that quantum computing represents to cryptography which depends on the difficulty of the discrete logarithm problem—ECDSA and ECDH fall into this category. Because some classified information has a very long lifetime in which it must remain classified, the development of a practical quantum computer even twenty years from now still represents a threat, as an adversary could capture and store encrypted data and then use a quantum computer in the future to decrypt it. To counter this risk, NSA began accepting the use of Pre-Shared Keys (PSKs) as an alternative, or in addition to the EC-based (and all other quantum computer vulnerable) key-related ciphers. Provided minimum entropy is provided, PSKs are not threatened by development of a quantum computer.
Government cryptographic systems have depended on PSKs for decades. From the beginning, the most significant problem with PSKs was that they were difficult (a) to securely distribute, and (b) generate with sufficient cryptographic entropy to ensure they had the strength required to protect the information. In the past, to solve these problems, NSA developed and approved specialized equipment—collectively known as “Type 1” products. Type 1 products are typically classified, requiring stringent and sometimes operationally limiting Controlled Cryptographic Item (CCI) handling and Operational Security (OPSEC) procedures. Type 1 products are also export controlled under International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR). Further, Type 1 products are only permitted to connect to other Type 1 products—it would not be possible to use a Type 1 key loader with a commercial product to be used in CSfC.
The NIAP has published a Common Criteria document entitled “Protection Profile for Mobile Device Fundamentals” (MDF-PP). Devices which comply with the MDF-PP and have been evaluated by an independent testing laboratory are listed on the NIAP Product Compliant List. The US Department of Defense (DoD) published the DoD Annex to the MDF-PP which cites additional MDF-specific configuration controls. Devices compliant with both the MDF PP and the DoD MDF PP controls (both hereafter referred to collectively as “MDF devices”) provide baseline security capabilities appropriate for protecting classified information, when used in an overall NSA CSfC architecture.
As can be seen, there is a need for a system and process that provides quantum computer resistant algorithm cryptographic keys under the above described standards.